Denver Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 6

Article 3

January 1951

The Lawyers' Side of the Suits against Real Estate Brokers
William Rann Newcomb

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
William Rann Newcomb, The Lawyers' Side of the Suits against Real Estate Brokers, 28 Dicta 197 (1951).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

June, 1951

DICTA

THE LAWYERS' SIDE OF THE SUITS AGAINST
REAL ESTATE BROKERS*
WILLIAM RANN NEWCOMB
Chairman, Unauthorized Practice Committee, Denver Bar Association

It is difficult to speak on behalf of other lawyers because they,
themselves, are likely to entertain many different opinions. However, you should not be misled by the occasional lawyer who expresses opposition to the activity on behalf of the bar associations
in bringing these suits against real estate brokers. It is clear
that the overwhelming majority of lawyers in Denver and in
Colorado do support the purposes and the objectives of this litigation. You should also know that Colorado is not alone, and these
suits are part of a nationwide movement to clarify and define the
proper activities of title companies and real estate brokers.
WHAT ARE THE ISSUES IN THE SUITS?

The charge made by some people that we are trying to put
real estate brokers out of business is the purest form of unadulterated bunk, for that cannot possibly be the result even if the plaintiffs are 100 per cent successful. We do not challenge the right of
brokers to draw every instrument to which they may be a bona
fide party-and that includes the listing. We do not challenge the
right of any persons to act as their own lawyers in preparing
instruments to which they are parties. However, we are challenging the right of brokers and salesmen and title companies to prepare contracts of sale, receipts and options, deeds, leases, notices
to vacate, demands for rent or possession, mortgages, promissory
notes secured by deeds of trust, and other documents involved in
the closing of real estate transactions to which the brokers and
salesmen are not parties.
WHY DID WE BRING THEM?
There are three motives behind these suits:
1., The public interest. The broker is not qualified by education, training or experience to prepare legal instruments. Although he may pick up a smattering of information as to how to
fill in the blanks of a form, no one can reasonably argue that, as
a class, he is as well qualified to do these things as a lawyer.
Great harm has resulted in many instances to members of the
public from improperly prepared contracts and conveyances.
There is no question but what improperly prepared legal documents make for a great mass of the litigation in the courts of our
land. It therefore follows that the preparation of legal documents
should be confined to the care of those who are not only skilled by
reason of their profession and their experience, but as well, their
understanding of the legal significance of all terms employed in the
documents.1

* A digest of an address given by Mr. Newcomb before a meeting of the Denver

Realty Board on May 2, 1951.

1 In re George A. War], Misc. 51808, Detroit, Michigan.
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Is it only in court or in legal proceedings that danger lies in
such evils (unauthorized practice)? On the contrary, the danger there
is at a minimum for very little can go wrong in a court where . . .
the presiding officer is generally a man of judgment and experience
... not so in the office . . . Ignorance and stupidity may here create
damage which the courts of the land cannot thereafter undo.'

The public interest is further involved because a broker is
disqualified through his interest, as a businessman, in his commission from attempting to represent both himself and both
parties to a transaction. He attempts to serve three mastershimself, the seller, and the buyer. Virtually every lawyer in the
state has seen instances of where this inherent conflict in interests
has resulted in a disregard of the legal interests of the real parties
to a transaction. The broker performs his task when he produces
a buyer ready, willing and able to buy. Thereafter, the interests
of the purchaser and seller should assume the controlling role.
2. The interest of the lawyer. The lawyer normally spends
thousands of dollars securing his education. The law requires that
he be examined and licensed. No one here today would claim
that lawyers should not be licensed or that anyone, regardless of
qualifications, should be allowed to practice law in our complex
society. Consequently, in protecting his franchise, the lawyer is
upholding the laws which exist for the protection of the public.
The lawyer is at a competitive disadvantage with the layman who
practices law because the layman can solicit business and advertise,
whereas the lawyer is forbidden by his ethics from so doing. Therefore, this is not a matter of competing in the market place for
legal business, but is a matter of preventing unauthorized practices in the first instance.
3. The interest of promoting more harmonious relations
between brokers and lawyers. The bickering and back-biting between our two groups which I have witnessed in my eight years
of practice, and which has gone on, undoubtedly, for years before
that, is a direct result of a lack of clarification as to the proper role
of brokers and attorneys in real estate transactions. Just as a
lawyer normally has no business advising his client as to values,
the broker has no business advising a purchaser that the title is all
right because some mortgage company lent money on it five years
or six months ago. If these suits result in clarifying and defining
the "rules of the game," there is no reason why brokers and attorneys cannot work together in the interests of the public who
desire that their real estate transactions shall be handled efficiently,
economically, and with due regard to the legal rights of all parties.
Is THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THEM?
You real estate men will not be put out of business, even if
you are restrained from drawing what you call "our contracts."
We know that many of these contracts are prepared at night and
over weekends when lawyers are not available, but see no legitiWHAT

2 People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
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mate reason as to why a short delay to provide for a proper contract would unduly hamper your activities. If the deal itself was
not over-induced by "high pressure" salesmanship, there would be
no withdrawal by the purchaser in this interim period in the
vast majority of cases. We think that the importance of these
transactions, in any event, justifies mature deliberation and a
proper agreement between the parties. We further feel that even
though an occasional deal may fall through, to the chagrin of the
broker, the total volume of real estate transactions will not vary
one iota. We further see a possibility of working out some form
of simple receipt wherein the purchaser would evidence his good
faith by making a deposit, subject to a contract being written
within a very short period of time by an attorney of his selection,
or of the seller's selection, satisfactory to both. Of course, by its
very nature, such a receipt, if our theory of these suits is correct,
could not constitute a contract binding upon the parties.
I wish to emphasize that when the law is clarified as a
result of these suits, we will wish to sit down with you and attempt to work out a practical, workable understanding which will
not interfere with your legitimate operations and which will- be
in accord with whatever decision the courts ultimately render.
There is historical precedent for this in the Denver banks case
where an agreement was made between the Denver Clearing
House Banks Association and the Denver Bar Association pending
the litigation.
EDITOR'S NOTE: There follows a copy of the complaint
against one of the real estate brokers in the suits described above
by Mr. Newcomb. The suits against the other two brokers and
against the Title Guaranty Company and the Record Abstract and
Title Insurance Company are very similar. The complaint is reproduced here in its entirety for the information and enlightenment
of our own profession.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
AND STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO ----------DIV...............
THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION, a corporation;
THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, a corporation;
WM. RANN NEWCOMB, as Chairman of the Committee
of The Denver Bar Association on Unauthorized Practice; LAWRENCE A. LONG, as Chairman of the Committee of The Colorado Bar Association on Unauthorized
Practice; and WM. RANN NEWCOMB and LAWRENCE
A. LONG, individually,
Plaintiffs
vs
JOHN F. BRUNO,
Defendant

COMPLAINT
in Action for
Injunction
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The plaintiffs allege:
1. That the plaintiff, The Denver Bar Association, and the plaintiff, The
Colorado Bar Association, are corporations, other than for pecuniary profit,
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Colorado, and that each of them is organized for the following purposes and objects
among others: to advance the science of jurisprudence; to promote the administration of justice; to encourage a thorough legal edcuation; and to uphold
the honor and dignity of the Bar. That all of the members of each of them are
attorneys duly licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado. And that they
bring this action on behalf of the public and on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of their members.
2. That the plaintiff, Win. Rann Newcomb, is the Chairman of the Committee of The Denver Bar Association on Unauthorized Practice, and that he
brings this action as such Chairman, pursuant to express authorization by said
The Denver Bar Association. That the plaintiff, Lawrence A. Long, is the
Chairman of the Committee of The Colorado Bar Association on Unauthorized
Practice, and that he brings this action as such chairman, pursuant to express
authorization by said The Colorado Bar Association. That the said plaintiffs
Win. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long, also bring this action individually
on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other duly licensed attorneys in the
State of Colorado and on behalf of the public.
3. That the defendant is a real estate broker duly licensed as such under
the statutes of the State of Colorado. That the defendant now is and for many
years last past has been engaged in carrying on in the City and County of Denver, Colorado the business of a real estate broker.
4. That the defendant never has been licensed by the Supreme Court of
the State of Colorado to practice law in the State of Colorado and that he
therefore cannot lawfully practice law in the State of Colorado, either in his
own person or through his agents, servants or employees, whether they be attorneys or not.
5. That for many years last past the defendant has been engaged in the
unlawful practice of law in the State of Colorado by preparing for persons
other than himself, as a practice and in numerous transactions, either in his
own person or through his agents, servants and employees, instruments relating to and affecting real estate and the title to real estate, including deeds conveying real estate, deeds of trust and mortgages encumbering real estate,
promissory notes secured by such deeds of trust or mortgages, releases of deeds
of trust and mortgages upon real estate, receipts and options for purchase
contracts of sale and agreements, and by giving advice to the parties to instruments as to the legal effect thereof.
6. That, in doing the acts set out in paragraph numbered 5 hereof, the
defendant, in his own person or through his agents, servants and employees,
customarily in each instance: conferred with one or more of the parties to the
transaction or their agents; elicited in such conference what were considered to
be the pertinent facts; in the light of the information so elicited and the information contained in the abstract of title, selected and determined upon the
blank form or forms to be used; and then prepared one or more of the instruments mentioned in said paragraph numbered 5 by filling in such form or
forms in such manner as the defendant himself or the agent, servant or employee of the defendant preparing same, in his or her judgment, deemed proper
in the light of the information elicited in such conference and the information
contained in the abstract of title; and gave advice to the parties to such instruments as to legal effect of the instrument so prepared.
7. That the defendant was not a party to any of the deeds of conveyance
deeds of trust, mortgages, promissory notes, releases, receipts and options for
purchase, contracts of sale, agreements and other instruments prepared by him
or his agents, servants and employees as alleged in paragraph numbered 5
hereof, except that the deposit upon the purchase price,, the receipt of which
was acknowledged by each receipt and option for purchase, was paid to and
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held by the defendant as agent or broker; that the only connection of the defendant with the transactions, as a part of which said instruments were prepared and executed, was in the fact that the purchasers of the properties involved in such transactions had been procured by the defendant or that the
lender and the borrower had been brought together by the defendant and the
defendant received commissions for his services as a real estate broker in procuring such purchasers or in bringing together the lenders and the borrowers
and in the fact that the receipts and options recited that the deposit on the
purchase price was paid to and was to be held by the defendant as agent or
broker and in the performance by the defendant (either in his own person or
by his agents, servants and employees) of the services in the preparation of
said instruments and in the consummation or closing of the sale of or the loan
upon the real estate involved in the transactions; that, in some loan transactions, although the defendant was named in the promissory note and in the
deed of trust or mortgage as being the payee of such promissory note and
therefore appeared on the face of the said instruments to be a party to such
instruments, either the money loaned was the money of a principal for whom
the defendant was then acting and, shortly after the making of the loan, the
defendant endorsed and transferred the promissory note to his said principal
or it had, prior to the preparation and execution of said instruments, been
agreed between the defendant and a lending corporation that the defendant
should make the loan in his own name and should then endorse and transfer
the promissory note to the lending corporation and that the lending corporation should then repay to the defendant the amount so loaned and such agreement was carried out.
8. That, in almost all of the transactions in which the defendant and his
agents, servants and employees prepared legal instruments in the manner and
circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, the defendant had been employed as
a real estate broker to procure purchasers for the properties involved in the
transactions and had procured purchasers for such properties and had become
entitled to and was paid commissions for his services as a real estate broker
in procuring such purchasers, or the defendant had been employed as a real
estate broker to bring together the lender and the borrower and had brought
them together and had become entitled to and was paid commissions as a real
estate broker for doing so.
9. That, in the transactions in which the defendant and his agents, servants and employees prepared legal instruments in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, the defendant made no charge for services
in preparing said instruments, other than his commission for procuring the
purchaser or for bringing together the lender and the borrower.
10. That the defendant is now continuing the unlawful practice of law
in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore set out and that, unless restrained by order of court, the defendant will continue such unlawful practice
of law.
11. That, under the statutes of the State of Colorado and the rules of the
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, no person is permitted to practice law
in the State of Colorado without having previously obtained a license for that
purpose from the said Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and that, under
such statutes, each person to whom such a license to practice law is issued
must, before being permitted to practice law in said State, take and subscribe
on oath or affirmation that he will support the Constitution of the United States
and of the State of Colorado and that he will in all things faithfully execute
the duties of an attorney and counselor at law according to the best of his
understanding and abilities. That, under the rules of the Supreme Court of the
State of Colorado, in order to receive such a license to practice law in the
State of Colorado, a person must submit proof of his moral and ethical qualifications and his moral and ethical qualifications must be examined into and
must be found satisfactory by the said Supreme Court, and, in addition thereto,
either he must have been admitted outside of the State of Colorado to the
practice of law by the highest court of the jurisdiction having such power and
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have practiced law in such jurisdiction for a specified number of years or he
must have successfully completed two years of work in an approved college or
university preliminary to the study of law and completed the three year
course of an approved law school and passed a rigid examination as to his
legal educational qualifications. That the practice of law in the State of Colorado is, and of right should be, confined to those persons who are so found
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to possess the necessary qualifications for the practice of law in said State and who satisfactorily meet the
tests and furnish proof of the qualifications required by the said statutes and
said rules of said Supreme Court.
12. That each of the plaintiffs Wm. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long
now is and for a number of years last past has been an attorney duly licensed
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State of
Colorado and actually practicing law in said State with his office in the City
and County of Denver, Colorado. That the licenses which they and other attorneys have received to practice law in the State of Colorao are privileges and
franchises creating property rights in them and that the same have been and
are now being encroached upon and damaged by the unlawful practice of law
by the defendant in the manner and circumstances hereinbefore set out and
that, if such unlawful practice of law by the defendant is not restrained by
order of court, the said plaintiffs Wm. Rann Newcomb and Lawrence A. Long
as well as all other attorneys duly licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado and the public generally, will be greatly and irreparably damaged thereby.
13. That the interests of the public and particularly of those persons
owning, buying and selling real estate and those persons making and securing loans on real estate require that the persons who, pursuant to employment
prepare, in the State of Colorado, for others than themselves legal instruments
by which real estate and interests therein are conveyed, acquired, encumbered
released and otherwise affected shall be limited to those persons who have been
found by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to be qualified by their
education and moral and ethical qualifications to practice law in said State.
14. That plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
SECOND AND FURTHER CAUSE OF ACTION
AND, FOR A SECOND AND FURTHER CAUSE OF ACTION, The plaintiffs:
1. Adopt by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the First Cause of Action hereinbefore set out.
2. Allege that for many years last past the defendant has been engaged
in the unlawful practice of law in the State of Colorado by preparing for persons other than himself, as a practice and in numerous transactions, either
in his own persons or through his agents, servants and employees, leases of
real estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and demands to pay
rent or vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with respect to real
estate and by giving advice to the parties to such instruments as to the legal
effect thereof.
3. Allege that the defendant was not a party to any of the leases of real
estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and demands to pay rent or
vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or
terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with respect to real estate
prepared by him or his agents, servants and employees as alleged in paragraph numbered 2 of this cause of action, except that, in some instances, the
defendant was, for convenience, named in said instruments as the lessor, although he did not then own any interest in the real estate which was the subject of said instruments and, in so doing, he was acting only as the agent of
the lessor. And allege that the only connection of the defendant with the transactions, as a part of which said instruments were prepared and executed, was
in the facts that the tenant had been procured by the defendant or that the
landlord and the tenant had been brought together by the defendant or that
the defendant had been employed by the owner of the real estate involved to
manage the said real estate and that the defendant received commissions or
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other form of compensation for his services as a real estate broker in procuring the tenant or in bringing together the landlord and the tenant or in managing the said real estate or that, as hereinbefore alleged, the defendant was.
for convenience, named in said instruments as the lessor, although he did not
then own any interest in the real estate involved and, in so doing, he was
acting only as agent for the lessor.
4. Allege that, in the transactions in which the defendant and his agents
servants and employee prepared legal instruments in the manner and circumstances mentioned in this cause of action, the defendant made no charge for
services in preparing said instruments, other than his commission or other
form of compensation for procuring the tenant or for bringing together the
landlord and the tenant or for managing the real estate.
5. Adopt by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
numbered 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the First Cause of Action hereinbefore set out.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court adjudge and decree that
the defendant has been and is unlawfully practicing law in the manner and
circumstances hereinbefore set out and that this Court grant an injunction
restraining and enjoining the defendant and his agents, servants and employees
from preparing, on behalf of other persons, deeds conveying real estate, deeds
of trust and mortgages encumbering real estate, promissory notes secured by
such deeds of trust or mortgages, releases of deeds of trust and mortgages
upon real estate, receipts and options for purchase, contracts of sale of real
estate and agreements relating to and affecting real estate and the title to real
estate, leases of real estate, notices terminating tenancy of real estate and
demands to pay rent or vacate real estate and other instruments creating, continuing, modifying or terminating the relation of landlord and tenant with
respect to real estate, or any of said instruments, whether or not the defendant charges or receives compensation for the same and whether or not the
defendant has been employed as a real estate broker by one of the parties tc
the transaction or has procured the purchaser or the seller of the real estate
involved or has brought together the lender and the borrower or the landlord
and the tenant or has been employed by the owner of the real estate involved
to manage the said real estate and whether or not the preparation of such legal
instruments is done by or under the supervision of an attoreny employed by
the defendant, and that plaintiffs have such other relief as to the Court shall
deem proper, besides the costs of this action.
PERCY S. MORRIS,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
715 Security Life Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado.
The address of the Plaintiff The Denver Bar Association,, a corporation, is
319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver 2, Colorado.

Wm. RANN NEWCOMB pro se,
722 Symes Building,
Denver 2, Colorado.

The address of the Plaintiff The Colorado Bar Association, a corporation, ir
319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Den
ver 2, Colorado.

LAWRENcE A. LONG pro se
418 Symes Building,
Denver 2, Colorado.

DAY GIVES EVENING LECTURES AT REGIS
Judge Edward C. Day, of the Denver District Court will
lecture from June 12 to August 3 on Employer-Employee Relationships and on Court Procedure in the summer evening classes
conducted by Regis College on the campus. Judge Day's course,
among the 30 being offered at Regis this summer, will be held from
6:30-8:20 on Tuesday and Thursday evenings.

